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Evolution’s gift is the right account
of the origin of recoding functions
Andrew Wells
Department of Social Psychology, The London School of Economics and
Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, England. a.j.wells6lse.ac.uk
Abstract: Clark & Thornton argue that the recoding functions which are
used to solve type-2 problems are, at least in part, the ontogenetic products
of general-purpose mechanisms. This commentary disputes this and
suggests that recoding functions are adaptive specializations.
Clark & Thornton (C&T) have enhanced our understanding of the
nature of problem spaces with their distinction between type-1
and type-2 problems. Type-1 problems are solved directly. Type-2
problems are solved indirectly via recoding functions which make
manifest otherwise hidden regularities in input domains. Recod-
ing reduces type-2 problems to type-1. This is a valuable insight
and the statistical framework within which the distinction is
formalized is both apt and informative. C&T suggest that type-2
problems are commonplace in a wide variety of domains but are
regularly solved despite their computational intractability, which
results from the infinity of potential recoding functions.
A central question, therefore, concerns where the recoding
functions used to solve type-2 problems come from, and it is here
that C&T's analysis is problematic. One possibility, which is
currently at the heart of much promising work in evolutionary
psychology (Barkow et al. 1992), is that recoding functions are
task-specific, evolved adaptations. C&T are clearly unsympathetic
to this idea, which they call ªheavy-duty nativismº and they accept
only that it ªis no doubt sometimes plausibleº (Abstract).
The reasons for C&T's hostility to the evolutionary solution are
not made clear, but they appear to be uncomfortable with the idea
of a large number of adaptively specialized type-2 problem solving
devices. One of their goals is, therefore, to show how more
general-purpose mechanisms and processes might be used in the
solution of type-2 problems. Their preferred account of recoding
functions builds them via a two-stage ontogenetic process which
retains a central role for associative learning. C&T argue that the
first stage consists of associative learning over type-1 problem
domains which results in the achievement of specific representa-
tional states. In the second stage the achieved states can be used
more generally on a trial and error basis as potential recoding
functions for arbitrary problems which might thus be reduced
from type-2 to type-1.
The trouble with C&T's ontogenetic scheme is that it does not
solve the problem and hence there is no reason to prefer it to the
phylogenetic account of the origins of recoding functions. Let us
suppose that associative learning can modify the connectivity of a
module or a subnet, as hypothesized by C&T, to realize a specific
function which solves a type-1 problem. Let us further suppose
that the module can then be made more widely accessible for use
by other input domains, perhaps in one of the ways suggested by
Rozin (1976). It is hard to see what advantage this confers. The
difficulty with type-2 problems is that the space of potentially
applicable recoding functions is infinite. All that the first stage of
the ontogenetic process can achieve is to make one of these
recoding functions available to the problem solver. But unless
problem spaces have related structures, the second, trial and error,
stage of the process would be of no value, because the probability
is vanishingly small that the acquired recoding function would just
happen to reduce an independent type-2 problem in a useful way.
C&T appear to have no way to avoid this conclusion because they
accept that the principle relating achieved representations to
problem spaces is chance. ªEach such recoding may just happen to
reduce a problem that was previously type-2.º (sect. 4, para. 6).
C&T's reluctance to accept a phylogenetic account of the
origins of recoding functions is all the more curious in the light of
their enthusiasm for trading computation for representation.
Given that type-2 problems ªpermeate biological cognition right
down to its rootsº (sect. 5, para. 1) it is clearly the case that selective
pressure would be exerted in favour of mechanisms which instan-
tiated more powerful representations and thus solved problems
faster or more accurately than those that did not. It is a computa-
tional truism that special purpose machines are faster and more
efficient than general purpose machines and it is also evident that
natural selection preserves mechanisms which offer selective
advantage with respect to specific problems. Evolution's gift of an
appropriate set of type-2 problem-relevant recoding biases is
exactly what we ought to expect.
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Abstract: We argue that existing learning algorithms are often
poorly equipped to solve problems involving a certain type of
important and widespread regularity that we call ªtype-2 regu-
larity.º The solution in these cases is to trade achieved representa-
tion against computational search. We investigate several ways in
which such a trade-off may be pursued including simple incre-
mental learning, modular connectionism, and the developmental
hypothesis of ªrepresentational redescription.º
The target article explores a familiar topic (the limits of
simple statistical learning) in what we hope is a rigorous and
challenging way. Its motivation was simply the observation
that certain types of problem are both frequently solved (by
biological learning devices) and yet appear highly intrac-
table from a statistical point of view. These intractable (so-
called ªtype-2º) scenarios are ones in which the learner
must identify relations among raw input elements rather
than associations. The puzzle is: how is it possible for
limited biological agents to negotiate such statistically im-
penetrable problem domains? The answer is (we claim)
that short of being provided with antecedent search-space-
shrinking knowledge (in which case the problem does not
arise) the only hope lies in a ªbag of tricksº approach that
exploits general strategies for pressing maximal effect from
those rare cases in which, by chance, a useful re-coding has
been found. Re-coding is essential since it is a process that
can take a relational property and turn it into a bona fide
higher level element in a new space in which previously
complex and elusive properties (such as relations between
relations) appear as simple patterns (relations).
This thesis, we concede, can seem by turns trivial (of
course higher order relational learning is tough!), wildly
speculative (surely there are more direct ways of solving
this kind of learning problem?), over-technical (did we
really need statistics to make our point?), and under-
technical ( just how precise is the type-1/type-2 distinction
anyway?). It is to the great credit of the commentators that,
pretty much without exception, they responded construc-
tively, repeatedly underlining our central theme and offer-
ing a wealth of useful suggestions and links to other bodies
of work. Their responses bear mainly on six issues and we
divide our Response accordingly.
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R1. Is there still a Grand Ploy waiting
to be discovered?
Our claim was that no general algorithm can exist for the
systematic discovery of type-2 regularities in unrestricted
domains. The most nature can do is to press maximal utility
from whatever re-codings are found by chance or by simple
search in less problematic domains, or to adjust the prob-
lem space itself so as to better exploit the existing biases of
the human learning device (as in the Newport [1990]
conjectures about morphology). Some commentators, how-
ever, proved unable to suppress a laudable optimism and
felt (Berkeley, Haberlandt) that some more powerful and
general mechanism might yet be available. Thus Berkeley,
while appearing to be in agreement with much of our the-
sis, suggests that backpropagation networks using non-
monotonic units can in fact deal with the type-2 parity-
generalization scenario which we refer to in our paper. He
cites a number of simulation results which back this up. We
have no difficulty with this proposal and would only com-
ment that the use of such ªnonmonotonicº units equips the
learning method in question with an implicit recoding
ability and that this just happens to be appropriate for the
problem domain he concentrates on, namely parity gener-
alization. Thus Berkeley effectively demonstrates that a
suitably biased type-2 method can solve a type-2 problem.
Such a demonstration, however, is in no way suggestive of
the re-coders grail: a fully general algorithm that achieves
type-2 learning whatever the domain.
Several commentators (Oberlander, Stufflebeam,
and, to some extent, Kurtz) suggested that the nearest
thing that nature provides to such a general Grand Ploy may
be the use (by a lucky few evolved creatures) of a variety of
external representational systems such as language, maps,
graphs, and other kinds of real world structure. This is a
powerful and important suggestion, and one that we merely
touched upon in our original treatment (see our comments
on Dennett in sect. 3 and on the potential role of real world
structures and action in sect. 4). We are, however, in full
agreement with the idea that external representations play a
very major role in empowering biological learning devices
(Clark, 1989, Ch. 7; Clark 1997).
We found Oberlander's thoughtful and constructive
commentary of special help in this regard. Oberlander
develops a number of very compelling examples of ways in
which we can simplify inner computations by adding struc-
ture to the local environment. This is a theme whose time
has clearly come, for it is surfacing again and again in recent
and influential work on so-called embodied and embedded
cognition (see e.g., Hutchins 1995 and Clark 1997), and it is
one that we intend to pursue in detail in our future work.
We cannot resist relating a further example, shown to us
by Roger Thompson (personal communication), that seems
perfectly to illustrate this theme. It concerns the ability of
certain chimpanzees (pan troglodytes) to use experience
with external tokens to enable them to perform higher
order matching tasks that they would otherwise find impos-
sible. The basic result, described at length in Thompson et
al. (in press) is that when trained to associate a relational
feature of some inputs (e.g., the feature of sameness) with
an arbitrary external token (such as a plastic heart), the
chimps can go on to learn to perform a higher order task
(matching relations between relations) that would other-
wise defeat them. Thus they become able to judge of two
pairs of objects ± such as two identical shoes and two
identical cups ± that the pair of pairs is an instance of the
sameness relation at a higher level, that is, sameness in
respect of sameness, each pair being itself an instance of the
basic relation of object level sameness. This task of match-
ing relation between relations is, we think, a clear instance
of a type-2 learning scenario. But one in which, as predicted
by Oberlander, the existence of external tokens capable of
reifying the relations between basic domain elements ren-
ders the problem tractable to on-board biological cognition.
We here trade externally provided props and structures
against expensive and perhaps even intractable episodes of
inner computation.
In addition to the dedicated seekers after a Grand
Ploy, some commentators suggested useful additional lo-
cally effective props and stratagems that might be added
to our bag of tricks. Szilas & Shultz note the virtues of
cascade correlation networks and suggest that a greater
use of between network connections may do much to
reduce the need for whole network copying and to over-
come mismatches of input size during episodes of analog-
ical reasoning. We agree that these and other technical
tricks may help explain in detail how codings developed
in one domain get to be transferred to others in which
they may, at times, reduce type-2 complexity to type-1
tractability. The basic strategy however is still simply the
re-use of achieved representation ± it is trading spaces
just as we envisaged it.
R2. The role of evolution
One contentious move in our original treatment was to
avoid reliance on what we (perhaps unadvisedly) termed
ªheavy-duty nativism.º Many otherwise sympathetic com-
mentators (Bullinaria, Wells, Elton, Dartnall) felt this to
be a too hasty dismissal of a potentially rich source of re-
coding functions. With this, however, we have no argument.
Our move was rather a strategic one, designed to focus
attention on the problematic (but surely inevitable?) resid-
ual range of cases in which evolution has not already done
our re-coding work for us. We thus accept Wells's (see also
Marcus) suggestion that ªevolution's gift of an appropriate
set of type-2 problem-relevant recoding biases is exactly
what we ought to expect,º at least as far as various evolu-
tionarily central learning functions are concerned. But if
evolution is to be the only source of such re-codings, the
lenses of human thought and science must be much weaker
and narrower that we had supposed. It seems implausible,
to us, to thus limit the space of humanly possible thought
(though it surely has limits ± just not ones directly set by an
evolved set of recoding functions). Hence our desire was to
explore any other strategies that might be available to us on
an ontogenetic or cultural-evolutionary time scale.
An interesting suggestion, from Bullinaria, is that learn-
ing algorithms that build in a few simple and biologically
plausible constraints may show improved performance on
many problems that would otherwise involve intractable
search. Such constraints include assumptions of symmetry
between certain weights and the assumption that local
information is more likely to matter than distal information.
Such fixes and biases constitute, it seems to us, some very
plausible ways in which a thrifty nature might subtly bias
learning systems so as to promote the successful learning of
specific skills in ecologically normal settings (see Karmiloff-
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Smith 1992; Clark 1993, Chs. 4 and 5). But once again our
primary target lies elsewhere in any residue of cases that
must be dealt with by ontogenetic or cultural-evolutionary
means.
Similar remarks apply to Skokowski's admonition to
look more closely at the architectural inheritance of our
biological brains. Of course, as Dartnall nicely points out,
this is hardly an all-or-nothing matter. Our ontogenetic
forays into type-2 space must be primed and rooted in early
episodes of thought and learning that exploit quite evolu-
tionarily basic mechanisms for apprehending and respond-
ing to our world. Like Dartnall, we envisage a cascade of
information-processing activity in which evolution's gifts
(Wells, Skokowski) and cultural and ontogenetic luck and
hard labor come together. Getting straight about their
relative contributions and complex interactions is, we think,
one of the most pressing tasks facing contemporary cogni-
tive science. The type-1/type-2 distinction is intended as a
heuristic tool in the service of just such an endeavor.
If, however, we live in a world in which evolutionarily
unanticipated type-2 learning scenarios are regularly en-
countered, the possibility arises (Bullinaria, Dominey)
that we may evolve if not fully general, at least multi-
purpose built-in strategies to support such learning. One
plausible contender for such a built-in ploy is whatever on-
board machinery supports the process of analogical reason-
ing. Analogical reason, as noted in our original treatment,
provides an open-ended means of re-using achieved re-
codings so as to view a new problem space through a highly
structured lens. Dominey's helpful and illuminating com-
mentary presents a convincing and powerful demonstration
of our basic thesis and clearly shows how analogical transfer
can at times help to overcome the problem. The central
example involved learning sequences not related by surface
structure but only by abstract underlying relational struc-
ture. Bullinaria shows both the (anticipated) failure of
type-1 learning and the success of an augmented model that
applies filters (see also Dartnall) transferred from other
learning experiences. We were especially impressed with
Bullinaria's demonstration that the filters for re-use could
be selected by a type 1 process of sequence recognition, as
this goes some way toward addressing the very real worry
(Wells) that it is unclear how to choose an achieved re-
coding for use in a new domain.
A very different set of issues comes to the fore in Elton's
interesting and provocative comments concerning some
important differences between evolutionary and ontogene-
tic learning scenarios. Elton claims that since problems and
solutions can co-evolve it is misleading to think of the issue
(over evolutionary time) as one of finding a kind of pre-
determined target mapping. Instead, he says, it is a matter
of finding a kind of behavioral profile that works and then
sticking to it. We agree but we do not see that this re-
statement in any way undermines our project. First, be-
cause our principal focus is, as we have said, on individual
and perhaps cultural-evolutionary learning. Second, be-
cause we already anticipated the role of co-evolution in our
original treatment (see our discussion of Newport [1990] in
sect. 3). And third, because there is really nothing in our
framework that commits us to the view that learning or
evolution is anything like passing an exam. In fact our entire
argument could be reformulated using Elton's own notion
that ªcreatures stick with [behaviours] that work.º Our
central notion would become the idea that recoding was
only involved in the acquisition of certain ªbehaviors that
work.º The rest of our story would remain the same.
R3. Statistics and theories
In pursuing arguments predicated upon the limitations of
simple kinds of statistically driven learning, we expose
ourselves to the rapid rejoinder that there are simply more
things on heaven and earth . . . specifically, what about
theory-driven thought, explicit, conscious reflection and
the like? Thus Leiser reminds us that advanced learning
answers to requirements of coherence and coordination
and suggests that we should attend more closely to the
peculiar dynamics of theory-formation. Memmi, like-
wise, suggests that the presence of rich theoretical contexts
and background knowledge deeply inform our advanced
searches for recoding biases for relational learning. And
Vinter & Perruchet (see also sect. R4 below) highlight the
role of explicit, conscious reflection in going beyond simple
statistical learning.
The general debate here, between theory-based and
statistics-based conceptions, is addressed from a connec-
tionist perspective in Clark 1993, Chapter 5. Our general
feeling, however, is that the distinction, though clearly
important, is easily overplayed. For we still need some
account of the origin of the theoretical pictures that thus
inform subsequent reasoning. And that origin, as far as we
can see, can involve only some combination of innate biases
and the fruits of an incremental cascade of statistically
driven learning.
One crucial link between ªmere statisticsº and explicit
human theorizing is powerfully displayed in Kurtz's very
pertinent commentary. Like us, Kurtz hopes to account for
complex theory-driven categorization without ªquitting the
tangible realm of experience and data.º This involves, Kurtz
suggests, going beyond mere perceptual similarity without
losing the solid statistical foundations that are, we believe,
the root of all learning. And this in turn involves the
recognition and reification of additional functional regu-
larities, that is, abstract features that unite disparate in-
stances via the common actions they evoke, the common
goals they relate to, and so on. In this way the idea of in-
crementally constructed, statistically-based feature spaces
phases, rather naturally, into the idea of something akin to a
theory based take on the various domains of human activity.
Our goal is thus not to sever statistical and theory-driven
learning but to understand various levels of theoretical
understanding as themselves the fruits of an incremental
sequence of episodes of type-1 learning, augmented by
various tricks involving the re-use of achieved representa-
tional resources.
The latter stratagems will often include the uses of
analogical reason, and the roles of culture, language, and
conscious reflection as stressed by Memmi, Leiser, Vinter
& Perruchet, and others. But what we should not do, we
believe, is simply to invoke ªtheories and background
knowledgeº as the sufficient answer to the hard question,
How is type-2 learning possible at all? For such an invoca-
tion is ultimately unexplanatory, trading a problematic
chicken for an unexplained egg. Instead, we need to see
how such theoretical knowledge can arise from real con-
frontation with environmental data and how it can be
maximally exploited in future learning.
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R4. Cognitive psychology
One of the most fruitful and exciting outcomes of the BBS
process was, for us, the discovery of a quite unexpected
wealth of links and connections between our (machine
learning based) work and ongoing research in various areas
of cognitive psychology, such as implicit learning (Vinter &
Perruchet, Dominey), analogical reason (Dominey), cat-
egorization (Kurtz), and general research on re-coding
(Haberlandt). Vinter & Perruchet, in particular, reveal
very promising links between some of our claims and work
on so-called implicit learning (learning without conscious
or linguistic reflection). They agree that the ploys and
stratagems we uncover help reveal how very complex prob-
lems can be dealt with by elementary, statistics-based
processes and note that the course of such learning as
predicted by our model is in good accord with experimen-
tal research (their own and others) on implicit learning in
human subjects. They worry, however (and this ties in with
the theory/statistics issues mentioned above) that we fail to
address more explicit modes of thought and hence fail to do
justice to the full spectrum of human learning.
Our reason for thus stopping short is ± as noted above ±
that we really do believe that in a certain sense there really
is no other kind of learning to be had. Such learning, at the
very least, lies at the heart of all existing algorithms capable
of learning about a domain and not equipped with heavy,
task-specific initial biases. We do not deny, of course, that
acquired knowledge can be used precisely so as to induce
biases that will in effect take the system beyond the domain
of visible statistical features of the inputs. Indeed, this is
exactly our point: that the only way to go ªbeyondº the
statistics is to use knowledge, itself acquired through earlier
instances of type-1 learning (or else innate) so as to re-shape
the space for future learning.
Vinter & Perruchet seem to suggest, in addition, that
there may be special features of conscious thought and
reflection that enable us to do more than simply re-shape
the space for learning. Such features would include, for
example, the use of ªprocesses which rely on the specific
power of conscious thought.º Once again, however, we fear
a chicken and egg scenario. Our goal is to understand how
biological agents can come to wield the knowledge to which
such powers may be applied. We do concede, however, that
certain aspects of very high level thought look to lie beyond
the scope of our treatment. Thus Vinter & Perruchet (also
Dartnall) mention the human ability not just to know a
recoding function but to know that we know it. Such
knowledge is not of the world so much as of the ways in
which we know the world. This certainly does seem like an
important ability though the extent to which it figures in
daily problem solving is perhaps open to doubt. Whether
such top level, meta-reflective capacities merely represent
the culmination of a cascade of processes of type-1 learning
and re-deployment of achieved representation (as we sus-
pect) or rely on the operation of some wholly different
faculty (perhaps tied up with conscious thought) is an
important topic for further research. It is, of course, very
likely that different neurological structures play a role in
type-1 learning and type-2 re-coding (see, e.g., Dominey's
comments on the role of the frontostriatal system in type-1
learning). But this is consistent with our claim that the
combination of these strategies is effectively all that nature
can provide.
Halford's useful and interesting commentary suggests
that the type-1/type-2 distinction can help to clarify several
issues in the development of children's understanding of
mathematics. Halford then makes the important point that
not all re-codings are reversible, that is, that it may not be
possible to re-create the original data from the recoded
data. To avoid this loss of potentially useful information, he
suggests a technique that involves representing the input as
multiple distinct dimensions that are then processed to-
gether. The basic idea sounds interesting, but we found the
details of the suggestion elusive. One worry is that, in
Halford's own example, the probabilities are based on
complete entries in the target mapping. But a complete
listing would here constitute a direct recapitulation of the
training set ± a fact which seems to reduce the technique to
the use of a look-up table. In any case, it seems to us that, in
this case, one simply cannot have one's code and eat it! In a
sense the information-losing properties of the recoding
process are crucial since they power the simplification and
data compression that in turn lead to the properties of
improved search and generalization that the whole process
is designed to support. The only real hope in this area, it
seems to us, lies in the use of what Karmiloff-Smith (see her
1992, pp. 21±24) once termed conservative redescription ±
a process in which re-codings are generated but the original
representations remain intact and available for use in cer-
tain contexts.
In general, then, we were especially pleased to discover
these rich links between our themes and treatment and
ongoing work in cognitive psychology. One commentator,
however (Ohlsson), felt that our treatment amounted to a
reversion to a discredited behaviorist vision of psychology ±
one which concerned itself not with the understanding of
inner mechanisms but only with patterns of stimulus and
response. Here (as with Elton) it seems we may have
misled by our use of the vocabulary of target mappings,
input-output mappings, and so on. But of course we do not
wish to claim that no important and contentful inner states
mediate between inputs and outputs. Indeed, our whole
argument is devoted to displaying the sheer complexity and
importance of the search for fruitful inner transformations
to be applied to raw input patterns. When Ohlsson says that
ªthe idea that what is learned [by human learners] is an
input/output mapping (or a set of stimulus-response con-
nections) was abandoned in the 1950s because people
began taking the generativity of human cognition seri-
ously,º we are in complete agreement! We are perplexed
that Ohlsson sees our paper as in any way disputing this.
Our central aim was, in fact, to argue that interesting forms
of learning involved not the acquisition of stimulus-
response conditions but rather the construction of complex
recoding structures (possibly under incremental learning
regimes), which would then provide the basis for generative
knowledge enabling the learner to go beyond any presented
data.
R5. Internal representation
All our talk of inner re-codings raised the hackles of some
commentators who seem a little leery of the very idea of
internal representation (Stufflebeam) or who wanted at
least to suggest some possible alternative mechanisms
(both internal and external) for achieving the same kinds of
result (Dartnall, Oberlander). We have already endorsed
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the suggestion (Oberlander, Stufflebeam) that external
structures may sometimes contribute mightily to successful
type-2 learning. Stufflebeam seems, in addition, to want to
cast doubt on the idea that inner states properly thought of
as representation have any role to play in the process at all.
We demur, but this is a large and lively debate that we
cannot hope to do justice to here ± see Clark (1997) for a
defense of a kind of modest representationalism consistent
with our claims. We would, however, comment that to
whatever extent a system creates inner states that effec-
tively reify relational features of the inputs that carry
adaptively significant information (as where the chim-
panzees learn to match higher order sameness), it is hard to
see why we should refuse to label such states internal
representations.
Dartnall draws a useful distinction between this (weak)
notion of internal representation and one more closely tied
to the idea of conscious thought and reflection. Dartnall
usefully locates our discussion as part of a larger research
program whose goal is to understand the transition between
connectionist competence and structured thought. In this
context, he suggests that the early stages of our ªre-codingº
cascade may be more fruitfully conceived in terms of a
sequence of increasingly powerful ways of accessing the
knowledge rather than in terms of re-codings of the knowl-
edge itself. This is an interesting idea and one that seems to
invite a slightly different perspective on Karmiloff-Smith's
notion of representational re-description ± a notion that
provided much of the motivation and inspiration for the
present treatment [see multiple book review of Karmiloff-
Smith's Beyond Modularity BBS 17(4) 1994]. We are not
yet convinced, however, that this distinction (between
changing access and changing knowledge) is deep and well-
defined. But it certainly suggests some directions for future
research, perhaps using some concrete computational
models to refine our currently hazy intuitions.
R6. Technicalia
A number of commentators made useful technical sugges-
tions concerning the description of the type-1/type-2 dis-
tinction, and raised important questions about the relations
between the parity considerations and generalization and
the example of the Elman net. Thus Damper (see also
Gaskell) worries that holding back even a single pattern on
the classical (2 variable, XOR) parity problem simply makes
the problem insoluble (the machine would need to read our
minds to know the intended function) as the learning
algorithm lacks sufficient data. He concludes that it must be
wrong to link parity learning to issues about generalization.
But let us step back a little here and review our strategy in
more detail. In the paper we suggested that backpropaga-
tion learning does not provide a ready-made solution to the
problem of type-2 scenarios and backed this up with a
demonstration that backpropagation reliably fails on some
forms of parity-generalization problem. The slight novelty
in this was indeed the utilization of parity as a generalization
problem. Where parity problems have been used in ma-
chine learning, they have typically been presented as mem-
ory tasks, that is, learning methods have been required to
acquire complete mappings. One of the justifications put
forward for this approach is the idea that parity constitutes
an ªunfairº generalization problem. Damper's commentary
is valuable because is shows how muddled the thinking
behind this judgment can be.
Damper implies that parity cannot be a generalization
problem because parity mappings exhibit neutral statistics,
that is, chance-level output probabilities. This observation
was a fundamental component in our own presentation.
But it demonstrates not that parity problems are un-
generalizable but merely that they cannot be generalized
on the basis of statistical effects.
In coming to terms with the idea of parity generalization,
it is useful to turn attention away from the familiar XOR
case towards higher-order cases. In 4-bit parity there are 16
cases. The removal of a single case leaves 15 cases as a basis
for generalization. Somehow this does not seem quite so
unreasonable. It may also be helpful to consider the two-
spirals problem in which the learning algorithm must learn
to correctly assign a 2-d point to one of two interlocking
spirals in an image. The problem is parity-like since
nearest-neighbors in the input space always have opposite
classifications. And indeed, the statistics of a typical training
set are usually nearly neutral. And yet, as far as we are
aware, this problem has never been treated as anything
other than a generalization problem.
Despite Damper's objections to our use of parity gener-
alization problems, he has no difficulty with our central
thesis that learning problems which require recoding pre-
sent a special and cognitively important case.
Turning to the type-1/type-2 distinction itself, Chater
argues that the distinction is simply ill-defined and hence
will confuse rather than clarify matters. Notice, however,
that we took some care, in section 1 of the paper, to stress
that ªthere is no obvious operational definition for the class
of type-2 problems.º However, by proceeding on the basis
that such a definition exists, and indeed that our paper was
supposed to provide it, Chater has arrived at a number of
interesting though strictly speaking irrelevant observations.
His approach involves taking our analysis of the ways in
which supervisory feedback can provide justifications for
assignments of particular probabilities to particular outputs
as a formal definition of a problem class. He shows that this
soon leads to nonsensical results and enables dubious
maneuvers such as the adding of ªdummy variablesº so as
to change the ªformalº characterisation of a particular
problem.
These arguments may be of interest to the computational
learning theorist. However, they completely miss the point
of our paper and in some cases actually mislead. For
example, Chater contrives to show that if we try to give
identity-function learning a classification using his ªformal-
izationº of our framework, certain ambiguities result. How-
ever, this conceals that fact that identity-function learning
actually has a rather natural characterization as a type-2
operation within our framework.
Assume that the input for the learner is based on two
variables ± one representing the input to the identity
function and the other representing the output ± and that
the target output for the learner is a value which shows
whether the input forms a valid application of the identity
function (i.e., whether the two input values are the same).
In this scenario the learner's guessing of a particular output
cannot be justified on the basis of observed frequencies in
the training data since every input value is unique. How-
ever, were we to recode the learner inputs by applying an
identity recognition function to them, we would produce a
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recoding of the problem which could be solved in exactly
that ªstatisticalº way. Thus identity function learning is
naturally characterized in our framework as requiring re-
coding and hence is type-2.
Golden, in his gracious and intriguing commentary,
offers an amendment to our account of type-1 learning. He
suggests that the category can be broken down into sub-
cases using a ªparametric, model-based approachº and that
this may help avoid some potential problems. Alas, we are
not sufficiently familiar with the background material for
this proposal to properly judge its value or necessity. We
agree, however, that there may well exist other (perhaps
more elegant) ways of picking apart the kinds of cases we
wish to distinguish, and we look forward to Golden (forth-
coming) to learn more about the methods he has in mind.
Finally, some questions were raised concerning the role
of the Elman network in our discussion. Thus Marcus
argues that the Elman network (Elman 1993) fails to
illustrate our central point as it does not, after all, learn
about higher order regularities in the data set. The evidence
that Marcus relies on, however, concerns only the failure of
such a net to generalize an abstract structure (an X is an X)
when presented with a case involving a totally novel ªfillerº
(a dax is an . . . ). It may be that such extensions simply
require more than the kind of grammatical knowledge that
the data set makes available. In any case, it does not follow
from this kind of failure that the original network does not
acquire grammatical knowledge that is higher order in the
sense we require. For the successful network did indeed
proceed by first identifying lower level grammatical fea-
tures and then going on to learn about regularities involving
relations between these lower level features. In fact, this is
exactly what the incremental batching/staged memory ma-
nipulations were designed to encourage. Gaskell seems to
worry that the need for such manipulations renders the
network unsuitable for our purposes. We do not see why:
our point here is simply that the desired performance is
achieved only by the prior isolation (by whatever means) of
a ªbuilding blockº set of regularities which then mediate
between the raw data and the target mapping so as to shrink
the search space to a manageable size. The network thus
trades prior learning against subsequent search.
Taken together, the various commentaries have done
much to advance (and where necessary, to unsettle) our
thinking about the nature of learning and the canny ways in
which biological cognizers may trade achieved representa-
tion against potentially infinite computational search. Our
treatment, we readily concede, can easily appear either trite
or wildly speculative. Few disagree with the central tenet
(re-coding matters!). Few will concede our central claim
(that the maximal exploitation of the fruits of simple learn-
ing or chance penetrations into type-2 space is the best
nature can provide). We hope, however, to have fueled the
fires of debate. And we thank all the commentators for their
thoughtful and genuinely constructive responses. We have
learnt a lot, and we look forward to trading it against our
future search in computational space.
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